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Abstract
We analyze the short and long run effects of demographic ageing—increased
longevity and reduced fertility—on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures
direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and
capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, govern-
ment spending components and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium.
Growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by pub-
lic investment. The closed-form solutions of the model predict taxation and the
retirement age in OECD economies to increase in response to demographic ageing
and per-capita growth to accelerate. If the retirement age were held constant, the
growth rate in politico-economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged,
due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment.
JEL Codes: E62, H5, J26
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1 Introduction
The prospect of “graying” populations in many developed economies raises concerns about
the sustainability of economic growth. According to these concerns, rising old-age depen-
dency ratios translate into growing tax burdens while generous pension and health care
benefits crowd out public investment spending for infrastructure or education, with nega-
tive effects for capital accumulation and productivity growth. However, the demographic
transition has been ongoing for a while—developed economies have experienced a marked
decrease in fertility and increase in longevity for several decades—without producing clear
evidence that this transition has caused a fall in per-capita growth. Rather to the oppo-
site, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find in growth regressions that both a decrease in
the fertility rate and an increase in longevity are associated with higher growth rates.1
1Falling fertility and increasing longevity can give rise to a temporary reduction in the (young-age)
dependency ratio, generating a “demographic dividend” of higher growth. In developed economies,
this growth dividend is predicted to be exhausted around the year 2010 (e.g. Bloom, Canning and
Sevilla, 2003). Also, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) estimate the effect of life expectancy at birth on
economic growth. They find no evidence of a positive effect.
1
The evidence is similarly mixed as far as government budgets are concerned. While
the GDP share of transfers to the elderly has increased, the share of public investment
does not show a clear trend in most countries, see Figures 1 and 2.2 3 Moreover, most
developed countries have started to increase the retirement age or tighten the conditions
for early retirement, reducing the pressure on social security taxes.
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Figure 1: Public expenditure on pensions, percent of GDP. Source: Tanzi and Schuknecht
(2000), OECD.
!"!#
$"!#
%"!#
&"!#
'"!#
(!"!#
($"!#
(%"!#
()&!# ()'!# $!!!#
*+,-./#
0/+1,-2#
34,52#
6,7,-#
89#
8:;#
Figure 2: Public expenditure on education and infrastructure investment, percent of GDP.
Source: Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), OECD.
To interpret this data and gauge likely future developments, we develop a tractable
model to analyze the effects of demographic ageing on government budgets and per-capita
growth. Building on a standard overlapping generations setup with private and public
capital formation sustaining endogenous growth, our framework features two demographic
2Data is taken from Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and OECD sources (Society at a Glance, 2009, old-
age cash benefits, disability pensions and survivors’ pensions; Economic Outlook, 2008, government fixed
capital formation; Education At a Glance, 2008, direct public expenditure plus subsidies to households
and other private entities). The GDP share of infrastructure investment has fallen in some countries, in
contrast to the GDP share of education spending. In this paper, we do not analyze the composition of
public investment.
3In cross section data for the United States, the fraction of elderly residents in a district was negatively
associated with education spending per child (Poterba, 1997).
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driving forces—fertility and longevity—and a number of economic and political choices.
In their role as economic agents, households in the model take prices, taxes, public invest-
ment, the retirement age and retirement benefits as given when choosing consumption,
savings, and labor supply. In their role as voters, households choose among office moti-
vated parties that offer policy platforms comprising labor income taxes, the expenditure
shares for inter-generational transfers and public investment (reflecting spending compo-
nents of central importance for developed economies), as well as the retirement age. The
political process lacks commitment, and elections take place every period.
Policy choices in the model are of different concern to young and old voters: the
exposure of households to labor income taxes changes over the life cycle; the old benefit
from social security transfers to their group but are hurt by an increase in the retirement
age; and only the young benefit from the returns to public investment. When evaluating
the policy platforms on offer in the political arena, voters therefore disagree as to which
platform should ideally be implemented. We model the resolution of the ensuing conflict
under the assumption of probabilistic voting, reflecting a small degree of randomness in
voters’ support for a party. In equilibrium, vote-seeking parties propose a policy platform
maximizing average welfare of all voters, and changes in the economic or demographic
environment give rise to a gradual adjustment of the policy instruments.
Policy choices do not only affect economic outcomes. Absent commitment, they also
affect, indirectly, future policy decisions. In addition to the “economic” repercussions of
their policy choices, voters internalize the “political” repercussions, reflected in the equi-
librium relationship between future state variables and policy choices. We assume that
only fundamental state variables enter this equilibrium relationship, excluding artificial
state variables of the type sustaining trigger strategy equilibria. While we agree that
the existence of intergenerational transfers or public investment may also owe to repu-
tational arrangements, we focus on the Markov perfect equilibrium in order to identify
the fundamental and robust forces that shape the size of these programs, and therefore
growth.4
Under standard functional form assumptions, we characterize the politico-economic
equilibrium in closed form.5 Changes in the demographic structure affect the equilibrium
allocation both directly and indirectly, by inducing policy changes. The direct effect
of changes in fertility and longevity works through modified private savings and labor-
supply decisions which in equilibrium manifest themselves in faster capital accumulation.
Indirectly, demographic ageing affects growth because it alters the relative political power
of the old and the effect of later retirement on aggregate labor supply. At the same time,
higher longevity increases the political support for public investment.
To quantify the equilibrium implications of demographic ageing, we analyze calibrated
versions of the model representing a rich OECD economy, a rich European OECD econ-
omy, the United States, and Japan. For each of the countries and country blocks, the
model predicts that the forecasted demographic changes give rise to a continued increase
of the GDP share of social security transfers, a slightly higher GDP share of public in-
4For a discussion of Markov perfect equilibrium see Krusell, Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull (1997).
5Our functional form assumptions imply a minimal amount of strategic interaction between policy
makers in different periods.
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vestment, a strong increase of the retirement age, and a rise in per-capita growth. In
particular, annual per-capita growth is predicted to accelerate by approximately 35 basis
points towards the end of the century.
Importantly, these findings hinge on the assumption that both fiscal policy and the
retirement age are endogenous. With constant policy instruments, the growth rate would
increase more strongly than in politico-economic equilibrium. With endogenous tax rates
and budget shares but a fixed retirement age, the per-capita growth rate would essentially
remain stuck at its current level in the medium run and increase only slightly in the long
run, due to a surge of social security transfers and crowding out of public investment.
The central predictions of the model are robust to a variety of changes in the modeling
assumptions. In particular, the results do not change if capital income taxes in addition
to labor income taxes are introduced or if the balanced-budget assumption is relaxed.
The results are also robust to replacing the endogenous growth specification by one of
exogenous growth. In the model, the political process does not internalize the long-
term benefits of public investment because these occur beyond the lifetimes of even the
youngest voters. As a consequence, the exact specification of productivity growth has no
effect on the evolution of the policy instruments and the government budget shares in
politico-economic equilibrium. Moreover, as we show, it does not have a strong effect on
the evolution of output per capita in the medium run either.
While broadly consistent with the evidence, the model predictions contradict the com-
mon view among policy makers that the political process will implement measures to raise
productivity in order to “outgrow” the burden imposed by demographic change.6 Accord-
ing to the model, demographic ageing indeed induces the political process to raise public
investment in order to foster productivity growth. However, the main positive growth
effects arise directly while the net effect of endogenous policy on growth is negative.
Our work relates to the literature analyzing the effects of government policy on growth,
see Barro (1990), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) or Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) for a
review. Our contribution relative to these papers lies in modeling the determinants of pol-
icy and linking fertility and longevity to growth.7 Galor and Weil (1999), Cervellati and
Sunde (2005) and Soares (2005) analyze the growth effects of demographic change due to
its impact on private savings and education decisions, and Hazan (2009) introduces private
retirement decisions in a model of human capital accumulation. Our model complements
these papers by modeling the role of policy and its determinants in politico-economic equi-
librium, and by focusing on the ongoing demographic transition in developed economies
rather than historical developments.
Our work also relates to politico-economic models of redistribution and growth. Alesina
and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Krusell et al. (1997) argue that in-
equality depresses growth because anticipated redistributive taxation reduces the incentive
to accumulate, or because higher inequality pushes the median voter’s preferred level of
public investment and taxes beyond the growth-maximizing level. Relative to these pa-
pers, we focus on inter- rather than intragenerational conflict, consider a larger set of
6See, for example, the discussions surrounding the European Union’s “Lisbon Agenda.”
7Azzimonti, Sarte and Soares (2009) analyze capital formation by a benevolent government without
commitment in a representative agent economy.
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policy instruments available to policy makers, and focus on the implications of fertility
and longevity on growth. Our analysis therefore sheds light on the equilibrium size and
composition of the government budget, and it emphasizes how demographic ageing affects
both this composition and growth.8 9
Like Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999) and Rangel (2003), our paper analyzes the
choice of productive versus redistributive public spending in an overlapping-generations
model. In these papers, voters support public investment even if they do not directly
benefit from it because a trigger strategy links investment spending to the provision of
public pensions in the future. Our model adopts a different perspective. Rather than
emphasizing complementarities between investment spending and transfer payments, it
focuses on the conflict over the size of these two spending components, and how the
resolution of this conflict is shaped by fertility and longevity. The model also differs
from these papers in that it features political and economic choices, embedded in the
standard growth model. This allows us to model the macroeconomic consequences of
population ageing in a rich setting without having to sacrifice analytical tractability.
Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) argue that public investment might rise in response to
increased longevity. Our model incorporates the mechanism underlying Gradstein and
Kaganovich’s (2004) argument. In addition, it features a role for fertility, the retirement
age, a second government spending component that competes for funding, and—central
to our analysis—growth effects of policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and characterizes the allocation conditional on policy. Section 3 solves for the politico-
economic equilibrium and analyzes its properties. Section 4 contains the analysis of the
short and long-run effects of demographic ageing on government budgets and macroeco-
nomic outcomes, in particular the growth rate. Section 5 concludes.
2 Economic Environment
We consider an economy inhabited by two-period lived overlapping generations: young
households and old households. Young households in period t supply labor, pay taxes,
consume and save for retirement. They face idiosyncratic longevity risk: with probability
pt+1 ∈ (0, 1], they survive to become old households in period t + 1. Old households in
turn consume the return on their savings, old-age benefits and the proceeds of their labor
income in old age. The size of this labor income depends on the retirement age, ̺t, and
the labor productivity of old relative to young workers, χ ≥ 0.10 If ̺t = 0 or χ = 0, the
effective per-capita labor supply of old households equals zero. Old households die at the
end of the period.
8Our work shares with Krusell et al. (1997) the restriction to Markov perfect equilibrium. Method-
ologically, it is related to Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008).
9Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Perotti (1993) analyze distributive conflict in models with human
capital accumulation. They focus on the political choice of public versus private education and the effect
of distortive redistribution in the presence of borrowing constraints, respectively.
10To be precise, ̺t equals the fraction of the period that an old household is required to work.
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Each cohort consists of a continuum of homogeneous agents. The ratio of young
to old households in period t equals νt/pt, reflecting the gross rate of growth of the
number of young households νt (νt > 0), fertility for short, and longevity pt.
11 Both these
demographic parameters follow deterministic processes. On a balanced growth path, the
survival probability is constant at value p and the gross population growth rate is given
by ν. Savings of young households who die before reaching old age are distributed among
their surviving peers, reflecting a perfect annuities market.
2.1 Technology
A continuum of competitive firms transforms capital and labor into output by means of
a Cobb-Douglas technology. Capital depreciates after one period. The capital stock per
young household, kt, therefore corresponds to the per-capita savings of young households
in the previous period, st−1, divided by the growth rate of the number of young workers,
νt. We normalize the period time-endowment to unity and denote leisure consumption
of the young and labor productivity by xt and Ht, respectively. Labor supply by an old
worker in period t equals ̺t(1− xt) reflecting the assumption that young and non-retired
old households work the same number of hours.12 Labor supply per young household in
period t is then given by ψt(̺t)(1 − xt) with ψt(̺t) ≡ 1 + ̺tχpt/νt. Output per young
household in period t is given by
B0k
α
t [Htψt(̺t)(1− xt)]
1−α,
where B0 > 0 and the capital share α ∈ (0, 1).
Production factors are paid their marginal products, due to perfect competition. The
wage per unit of time, wt, and the gross return on physical capital, Rt, therefore satisfy
wt = (1− α)B0H
1−α
t k
α
t [ψt(̺t)(1− xt)]
−α,
Rt = αB0H
1−α
t k
α−1
t [ψt(̺t)(1− xt)]
1−α = wt
ψt(̺t)(1− xt)
kt
α′
with α′ ≡ α/(1− α). As a consequence of annuitization, the gross return on savings of a
young household that survives to old age equals Rˆt ≡ Rt/pt.
Labor productivity Ht reflects productive public investment during previous periods.
13
More specifically, productivity growth is a function of public investment per young house-
hold,
Ht+1 = B1H
1−δ
t I
δ
t ,
11Net immigration also affects the rate of growth of the number of young households.
12This assumption is not restrictive as changes in the hours worked by old households may be undone
by changes in the retirement age.
13Due to the Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function in the final good sector, Ht can
equivalently be interpreted as total factor productivity. Since our objective is to analyze the link between
changes in the size and composition of the population on the one hand and productivity growth on the
other, we do not allow for scale effects as they are sometimes considered in endogenous growth models.
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with B1 > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1) and It denoting investment spending per young household. A
specification of this type is standard in the literature.14
2.2 Government
The government taxes the labor income of young households in period t at rate τt + σt.
Revenues fund transfers to retired old households—the component corresponding to τt—as
well as public investment—the component corresponding to σt.
Denoting the total transfer to an old household by bt, we have
15
bt = wt(1− xt)τtνt/pt,
It = wt(1− xt)σt.
Public investment It, the transfer payment bt and the retirement age must be non-
negative (we exclude lump-sum taxes). The policy instruments therefore have to satisfy16
τt, σt, ̺t ≥ 0 for all t. (1)
We denote a combination of the policy instruments in period t by κt, κt ≡ (τt, σt, ̺t).
Note that we abstract from capital income taxes and impose a balanced budget re-
striction. Both assumptions are without loss of generality. As discussed in the working
paper version (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2007), a capital income tax rate would equal
zero in equilibrium since, from the perspective of political decision makers who set policy
instruments ex post, capital income taxes and old-age transfers are close substitutes.17
Similarly, old-age transfers and the repayment of government debt are close substitutes
as well, rendering a balanced-budget restriction non restrictive (see the discussion in Sec-
tion 5).
2.3 Preferences
Young households value consumption during young age, c1, and in old age, c2, as well
as leisure. Agents discount the future at factor β ∈ (0, 1). Due to the risk of death,
the effective discount factor of young households equals βpt+1. For analytical tractability,
we assume that the period utility functions of consumption and leisure are logarithmic.
Maximizing expected utility, a worker in period t solves the following problem:
max
st,xt
ln(c1,t) +m ln(xt) + βpt+1 [ln(c2,t+1) +m ln(1− ̺t+1(1− xt+1))]
s.t. c1,t = wt(1− xt)(1− τt − σt)− st,
c2,t+1 = stRˆt+1 + wt+1(1− xt+1)χ̺t+1 + bt+1,
14For example, Boldrin and Montes (2005) use the above specification (which is a special case of Rebelo
(1991)), with Ht interpreted as human capital and It interpreted as public education.
15The transfer received while actually retired is wt(1− xt)τtνt/(pt(1− ̺t)). The total transfer received
during old age is the product of this expression and 1− ̺t. Alternative normalizations do not affect the
results.
16We suppress the upper bound of unity on the retirement age since it will not be binding.
17In the presence of within-cohort heterogeneity, this need no longer be the case.
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where m ≥ 0 characterizes the preference for leisure. Note that the treatment of leisure
is symmetric over the life cycle. Leisure consumption during old age equals the difference
between the time endowment, 1, and the time spent working which reflects the intensive
and extensive (retirement) margins of labor supply.
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
The first-order conditions characterizing the households’ savings and labor-supply deci-
sions, respectively, are standard:
1
c1,t
= βpt+1Rˆt+1
1
c2,t+1
,
m
xt
= wt(1− τt − σt)
1
c1,t
.
Substituting, the Euler equation characterizing the optimal savings choice of an individual
household is given by
stRˆt+1 + wt+1(1− xt+1)χ̺t+1 + bt+1
βpt+1Rˆt+1
= wt(1− xt)(1− τt − σt)− st.
Using st−1Rt/νt = wtψt(̺t)(1 − xt)α
′, simplifying the left-hand side of the equation and
setting individual and average savings equal to each other, we find the aggregate savings
function
st = zt+1(τt+1, ̺t+1)wt(1− xt)(1− τt − σt),
where zt+1(τt+1, ̺t+1) denotes the savings rate of young households in period t,
zt+1(τt+1, ̺t+1) ≡
αβ
α(1 + βpt+1)/pt+1 +
1−α
ψt+1(̺t+1)
(
τt+1
pt+1
+ χ̺t+1
νt+1
) ≥ 0.
Note that the savings rate in period t depends on policy choices in period t + 1. (If
τt+1 > 0 or χ̺t+1 > 0, old households receive retirement benefits or labor income in
addition to the return on their savings. This renders the savings rate endogenous to
policy, even with logarithmic preferences.) If these policy instruments themselves depend
on aggregate savings, then the above relation characterizes savings only implicitly. We
return to this point when discussing the objective function maximized in the political
process.
Combining the first-order condition for leisure with the expression for c1,t yields
xt =
m(1− zt+1(τt+1, ̺t+1))
1 +m(1− zt+1(τt+1, ̺t+1))
. (2)
Note that labor supply is independent of contemporaneous taxes as income and substitu-
tion effects cancel.
The endogenous state variables at time t are Ht and kt. To simplify notation, we
work with the state variables Ht and qt ≡ H
1−α
t k
α
t instead. Let Lt ≡ B0(1 − α)qt(1 −
8
xt)
1−αψt(̺t)
−α = wt(1 − xt) denote labor income of a young household. Combining
kt = st−1/νt and the aggregate savings function with the dynamic budget constraint and
the expressions for factor prices, the equilibrium allocation can recursively be expressed
in terms of the following functions of state variables and policy instruments:
kt+1 = Lt (1− τt − σt) zt+1(τt+1, ̺t+1)/νt+1 = st/νt+1,
c1,t = Lt (1− τt − σt) (1− zt+1(τt+1, ̺t+1)),
c2,t = Lt νt
(
α′ψt(̺t)/pt +
τt
pt
+ χ̺t
νt
)
,
xt =
m(1−zt+1(τt+1,̺t+1))
1+m(1−zt+1(τt+1,̺t+1))
,
Ht+1 = B1 H
1−δ
t (Ltσt)
δ ,
qt+1 =
(
B1H
1−δ
t (Ltσt)
δ
)1−α
(Lt (1− τt − σt) zt+1(τt+1, ̺t+1)/νt+1)
α .


(3)
Conditional on initial values for the two endogenous state variables, (H0, q0), as well as
a sequence of policy instruments, {κt}
∞
t=0, conditions (3) fully characterize the equilibrium
allocation. Taking logarithms, we can express the laws of motion of the two endogenous
state variables as[
ln(Ht+1)
ln(qt+1)
]
=
[
1− δ δ
(1− α)(1− δ) α + δ(1− α)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡M
[
ln(Ht)
ln(qt)
]
+
[
ξHt (·)
ξqt (·)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ξt
(4)
where the definitions of ξHt (σt, ̺t, τt+1, ̺t+1) and ξ
q
t (τt, σt, ̺t, τt+1, ̺t+1) follow from (3).
In the special case with inelastic labor supply, m = 0, the equilibrium conditions (3)
maintain their validity and xt = 0.
2.5 Balanced Growth Path
Along a balanced growth path, all tax rates and demographic variables are constant, im-
plying that labor supply is time-invariant as well. From (3), the growth rates of kt, st, c1,t,
and c2,t then are equal to the growth rate of qt. The laws of motion for the two endogenous
state variables in (3) imply that, along the balanced growth path, the gross growth rate
of Ht, γH , equals the gross growth rate of qt. For any time-invariant choice of tax rates,
the last two equations in (3) therefore pin down the ratio Ht/qt on the corresponding
balanced growth path. Given this ratio, the same two conditions pin down γH and thus,
the balanced growth rates of qt, kt, st, c1,t, and c2,t:
γH =
((
B0ψ(̺)
−α(1− α)(1− x)1−α
)δ
B1−α1
(
(1− τ − σ)
z(τ, ̺)
ν
)αδ
σδ(1−α)
) 1
1−α(1−δ)
s.t. (2). (5)
Gross population growth ν has a direct negative effect on per-capita growth because it
reduces the capital stock per young household for a given savings rate (the effect captured
by ν in the denominator), and a positive effect because it reduces total labor supply and
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increases wages given the stock of capital per young household (the effect captured by
the term ψ(̺)−α). Longevity has a direct negative effect on growth by increasing total
labor supply and reducing wages given the stock of capital per young household (the effect
captured by the term ψ(̺)−α, again). In addition, changes in fertility and longevity affect
the savings rate and thus also labor supply of young households.
Income taxes depress growth because they lower disposable income of young house-
holds (the effect captured by the term 1− τ − σ), as do retirement benefits because they
lower the savings rate (z(·) is decreasing in τ). At the same time, public investment
fosters productivity growth (the effect captured by σ in the last term), in line with empir-
ical evidence (e.g., Blankenau, Simpson and Tomljanovich, 2007). Later retirement has a
negative effect on growth. It lowers the wages of workers (the effect captured by ψ(̺)−α)
and also decreases the savings rate.
In the following, we sometimes write the growth rate as γH((p, ν), κ(p, ν)) to indicate
that demographic change affects growth both directly and indirectly, by altering the
choice of policy instruments κt. Growth theory commonly analyzes the direct effect of
demographic change on growth, ∂γH((p, ν), κ)/∂(p, ν), or the direct effect of policy on
growth, ∂γH((p, ν), κ)/∂κ. Our objective is to analyze the combined direct and indirect
effects of demographic change on growth, dγH((p, ν), κ(p, ν))/d(p, ν). In Section 4, we
quantitatively assess these effects for advanced OECD economies.
Physical capital along the long-run growth path satisfies kt+1 = Lt(1−τ−σ) z(τ, ̺)/ν.
Since kt grows at the gross rate γH , it follows that(
Ht
kt
)1−α
=
γHν
B0ψ(̺)−α(1− α)(1− x)1−α(1− τ − σ) z(τ, ̺)
s.t. (2),
R =
αψ(̺)γHν
(1− α)(1− τ − σ) z(τ, ̺)
s.t. (2).
2.6 Exogenous Growth Specification
The recent growth literature supports the notion that technology diffusion or trade link-
ages work towards an equalization of growth rates across regions and countries (see, e.g.,
Acemoglu, 2009, ch. 18). In the context of our model, technology diffusion across coun-
tries can be modeled by positing that a country’s growth rate of H does not only depend
on public investment in that country, but also on investment or productivity growth in
other countries. For example, one may posit that
Ht+1 = B1H¯
(1−ε)(1−δ)
t H
ε(1−δ)
t I
δ
t ,
where 0 ≤ ε < 1 and H¯t denotes productivity in the rest of the world. (The model analyzed
so far corresponds to the case ε = 1.) To the extent that “foreign” productivity growth is
exogenous, “domestic” long-term productivity growth is exogenous as well. In particular,
domestic growth dynamics may then be modeled by a closed-economy specification,
Ht+1 = B1,tH
ε(1−δ)
t I
δ
t ,
10
where growth of H , k and q at rate γH is sustained by exogenous growth of B1,t at the
rate γB1 = γ
(1−δ)(1−ε)
H .
In this exogenous-growth specification, the equations for kt+1, c1,t and c2,t in (3) remain
valid while the law of motion for the state variables in (4) changes to[
ln(Ht+1)
ln(qt+1)
]
=
[
ε(1− δ) δ
ε(1− α)(1− δ) α + δ(1− α)
] [
ln(Ht)
ln(qt)
]
+ ξt, (6)
where ξt differs from the corresponding expression in the endogenous-growth specification
insofar as B1,t increases over time. The equilibrium expressions for Ht/kt and R given
above still apply.
3 Politico-Economic Equilibrium
We assume that young and old households vote on candidates whose electoral platforms
specify values for the policy instruments, κt. Voters do not only support a candidate for
her policy platform, but also for other characteristics (“ideology”) that are orthogonal to
the fundamental policy dimensions of interest. These characteristics are permanent and
cannot be credibly altered in the course of electoral competition. Moreover, their valuation
differs across voters (even if voters agree about the preferred policy platform) and is
subject to random aggregate shocks, realized after candidates have chosen their platforms.
This “probabilistic-voting” setup renders the probability of winning a voter’s support a
continuous function of the competing policy platforms, implying that equilibrium policy
platforms smoothly respond to changes in the demographic structure. This stands in
contrast to the “median-voter” setup where, in a model with only a few generations, a
small change in the demographic structure has large effects on policy outcomes if it alters
the cohort the median voter is associated with.
In the Nash equilibrium of the probabilistic-voting game with two candidates choosing
platforms to maximize their expected vote shares, both candidates propose the same policy
platform.18 This platform maximizes a convex combination of the objective functions of
all groups of voters, where the weights reflect the groups’ size and sensitivity of voting
behavior to policy changes. Those groups that care the most about policy platforms
rather than other candidate characteristics are the most likely to shift their support from
one candidate to the other in response to small changes in the proposed platforms. In
equilibrium, such groups of “swing voters” thus gain in political influence and tilt policy
in their own favor. If all voters are equally responsive to changes in the policy platforms,
electoral competition implements the utilitarian optimum with respect to voters.
Owing to political competition at the beginning of each period, policy makers cannot
commit to future policy platforms. Voters therefore have to form expectations about the
effect of current policy choices on future policy outcomes. Under the Markov assump-
tion, future leisure and policy choices are functions of the fundamental state variables
only, xt+1 = x˜t+1(Ht+1, qt+1) and κt+1 = κ˜t+1(Ht+1, qt+1). (The state variables include
18See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for discussions of the probabilistic-
voting setup.
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demographic variables, thus the time indices of the policy functions.) If the policy func-
tions are independent of (H, q), κt+1 = κ˜t+1, then (2) implies that the leisure function
is independent of (H, q) as well, xt+1 = x˜t+1, and both the aggregate savings function
and the economic equilibrium conditions (3) apply (recall the discussion of the aggre-
gate savings function in subsection 2.4). In the following, we conjecture that the policy
functions indeed are independent of (H, q). We derive the equilibrium choice of policy
instruments under this conjecture and show that this choice does not depend on (H, q),
thereby verifying the conjecture.
The political objective function, Wt(·), depends on the endogenous state variables (as
well as the exogenous ones, thus the time index), the contemporaneous policy instruments,
and the anticipated values of policy instruments and leisure in the following period. Let-
ting ω denote the per-capita political influence of old relative to young households, we
define
Wt(Ht, qt, κt; κ˜t+1, x˜t+1) ≡ ωpt {ln(c2,t) +m ln(1− ̺t(1− xt))}
+ νt {ln(c1,t) +m ln(xt) + βpt+1[ln(c2,t+1) +m ln(1− ̺t+1(1− xt+1))]}
s.t. (3), κt+1 = κ˜t+1, xt+1 = x˜t+1.
The program characterizing equilibrium policy choices in period t is given by
max
κt
Wt(Ht, qt, κt; κ˜t+1, x˜t+1) s.t. (1), Ht, qt given.
Political equilibrium requires that for any combination of state variables (Ht, qt), the κt
solving this program is given by κ˜t.
Using the equilibrium expressions for consumption from (3), the objective function
can be expressed as
Wt(·) = ωpt
{
ln
[
ψt(̺t)
−α
(
α′ψt(̺t)/pt +
τt
pt
+
χ̺t
νt
)]
+m ln(1− ̺t(1− xt))
}
+ νt
{
ln[ψt(̺t)
−α(1− τt − σt)]
+βpt+1 ln
[
(ψt(̺t)
−α)δ(1−α)+α(1− τt − σt)
ασ
δ(1−α)
t
]}
+ t.i.p. s.t. (2),
where t.i.p. denotes terms that are unaffected by contemporaneous policy choices (under
the conjecture), due to the logarithmic preference assumption. In particular, t.i.p. includes
Ht and qt and, with an exogenous growth specification, the parameter ε determining
the strength of the intertemporal spillover from H . Since the contemporaneous policy
instruments do not interact with the state variables Ht or qt, the equilibrium policy
functions are independent of these state variables, confirming the initial conjecture.19
Similarly, since in the case with an exogenous growth specification the parameter ε does
19In related work, we analyze the sensitivity of a parallel result to changes in functional form assump-
tions (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2005). We find that, in the case of generalized CRRA preferences,
state variables and policy instruments do interact. However, the quantitative implications for equilibrium
policies are negligible.
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not interact with the policy instruments, the equilibrium policy choices in the endogenous
and exogenous growth specifications of the model coincide. This is a reflection of the fact
that the political process does not internalize the long-term benefits of public investment
because these occur beyond the lifetimes of even the youngest voters.
Letting ∆t+1 ≡ 1+βpt+1(α+δ(1−α)) denote the semi-elasticity of young households’
utility with respect to labor income, the first-order conditions with respect to τt, σt and
̺t, respectively, read
ωpt
νt
1
pt
α′ψt(̺t)/pt +
τt
pt
+ χ̺t
νt
+ λτ =
1 + αβpt+1
1− τt − σt
,
δ(1− α)βpt+1
σt
+ λσ =
1 + αβpt+1
1− τt − σt
,
ωpt
νt
(
α′ψ′t(̺t)/pt + χ/νt
α′ψt(̺t)/pt +
τt
pt
+ χ̺t
νt
−
m(1− xt)
(1− ̺t(1− xt))
)
+ λ̺ =
αψ′t(̺t)
ψt(̺t)
(
ωpt
νt
+∆t+1
)
,
where the λs denote multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraints on the
policy instruments.
If the tax rates τt and σt are interior (as is the case in the data and in the simulations we
conduct later) and ̺t is in a corner then we can solve the former two first-order conditions
for
τt =
ωpt
νt
− α′∆t+1
ωpt
νt
+∆t+1
,
σt = βδpt+1
1
ωpt
νt
+∆t+1
,
implying that tax rates in period t depend on demographics in periods t and t+ 1.
If the three instruments have an interior solution, solving the first-order conditions
yields
τt =
(1− α)
(
ωpt
νt
+∆t+1
)
+ ωpt
νt
m−∆t+1
(
1 + χpt
νt(1−xt)
)
(1− α)(ωpt
νt
+∆t+1) +
ωpt
νt
m
,
σt = βδpt+1
(1− α)
(
1 + χpt
νt(1−xt)
)
(1− α)
(
ωpt
νt
+∆t+1
)
+ ωpt
νt
m
,
̺t =
(1− α)(ωpt
νt
+∆t+1)/(1− xt)−
ω
χ
m
(1− α)(ωpt
νt
+∆t+1) +
ωpt
νt
m
.
Since xt is a function of future policy choices (see (2)) it appears that, in this case, the
policy instruments effectively depend on current and all future demographic shocks. This
is not the case, however, because the combination of policy instruments entering into
the expression for labor supply20 in period t does not depend on 1 − xt+1 but only on
20This combination is given by 1−α
ψt+1(̺t+1)
(
τt+1
pt+1
+ χ̺t+1
νt+1
)
, see equation (2).
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parameters and demographic shocks in periods t+ 1 and t+ 2:
1− xt = 1−
m ω
νt+1
(1 +m) ω
νt+1
+ αβ
(
ωpt+1
νt+1
+∆t+2
) .
Accordingly, the equilibrium policy choices κt only depend on parameters and demo-
graphic shocks in periods t through t+ 2.
Demographic change affects the policy instruments through several channels. (Unless
otherwise noted, the comparative statics results for τt and σt hold even if ̺t is in a corner
or fixed.) First, by altering the relative political power of the old in the current period,
ωpt
νt
. Higher relative political power of the old (reflecting a higher number of old relative
to young households due to lower fertility or higher longevity in the previous period)
raises τt and lowers σt and ̺t.
21 Intuitively, more powerful elderly voters secure higher
intergenerational transfers and earlier retirement. Because taxes are distorting, funding
for other government outlays is reduced.
Second, demographic change affects the policy instruments by altering the effect of
later retirement on aggregate labor supply, χpt
νt
. A stronger such effect (reflecting a higher
number of old relative to young households, again) reduces τt and increases σt and ̺t.
Intuitively, a higher number of old relative to young households strengthens the extent to
which an increase in the retirement age translates into available resources. The additional
resources generated due to later retirement reduce the need for intergenerational transfers
and limit tax distortions. This allows to increase funding for public investment. The
combined effect of the first two channels (reflecting the number of old relative to young
households) is to raise τt and ̺t and lower σt in response to demographic ageing. That is,
the retirement age rises during the demographic transition although the relative political
power of the old increases when society ages.
Third, demographic change affects the policy instruments by altering the longevity of
young households, pt+1, and thus, the weight the political process attaches to the future
(see also Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004). With a higher such weight, public investment
becomes easier to sustain politically. As a consequence, an increase in longevity reduces
τt but increases σt and ̺t.
Finally, with an interior retirement age, demographic change affects the policy instru-
ments by altering future policy choices and thus, contemporaneous labor supply, 1−xt. In
particular, increases in pt+1, νt+1 and pt+2 all raise contemporaneous labor supply which
in turn increases τt and reduces σt and ̺t.
The comparative statics results working through the first channel correspond with
conventional wisdom. Often overlooked are the consequences of the other channels, as
well as the fact that their interaction generates non-monotone dynamics. For example,
a permanent shock to longevity may give rise to a fall in the tax rate τ in the period
preceding the shock (where longevity fosters the incentive to invest) followed by a recov-
ery thereafter (where it strengthens the political power of the old). In response to the
same shock, the tax rate σ may display the opposite dynamics while the retirement age
21We interpret the ratio ω/χ as ωpt
νt
/χpt
νt
.
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rises both in the short and the long run. Before the background of these non-monotone
dynamics, data about the short-run evolution of government budget shares cannot easily
be extrapolated to predict the direction of long-run change in these shares.22
The equilibrium policy functions κt are unique in the limit of the finite horizon econ-
omy. To see this, consider the final period T and note that labor supply is inelastic in this
final period (from (2)). The political objective function in period T therefore depends on
the consumption of young and old households,
c1,T = LT (1− τT ) and c2,T = LT νT
(
(α′ + 1)ψT (̺T ) + τT − 1
pT
)
,
respectively. Note that σT = 0 since there is no benefit of public investment in the final
period. Differentiating the political objective function in period T with respect to τT and
̺T yields two equations in the policy instruments that are independent of (HT , qT ). This
implies that κT is not a function of (HT , qT ). Moving to period T−1, the forgoing analysis
shows that the policy functions κT−1 are independent of (HT−1, qT−1) as well, and given
by the equilibrium expressions reported earlier. The result then follows by induction.
In Appendix A, we derive as a criterion for production efficiency along a balanced
growth path the requirement that
1 ≥ α′
I
s
> δ.
If either of the two inequalities is violated then a reallocation of investment spending
between I and s may weakly increase output in all future periods, and strictly in some
(see Cass, 1972). In particular, if the left inequality is violated, the economy accumulates
too much H and if the right inequality is violated, the economy accumulates too much
k. As shown in Appendix A, the economy necessarily over accumulates k relative to H
in politico-economic equilibrium. As a consequence, the allocation in politico-economic
equilibrium necessarily differs from the allocation supported by any Ramsey policy.23
4 Quantitative Implications of Demographic Ageing
Based on the analytical results derived earlier, we compute quantitative predictions for a
synthetic “rich OECD economy,” representing the population weighted average of Aus-
tralia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the
22The comparative statics with respect to the structural parameters of the model are intuitive. For
example, an increase in the preference for leisure, m, raises the marginal cost of working for the old and
induces the political process to reduce the retirement age and shift government spending from investment
to social security benefits. The effect working through changes in labor supply reinforces this adjustment.
If the retirement age is fixed, changes in m do not affect the two tax rates. An increase in the elasticity
of productivity growth to public investment, δ, leads to a reduction of τt and an increase in σt and ̺t.
23With exogenous growth (ε < 1), the production inefficiency result remains valid, see Appendix A.
The political process does not internalize the dynamic externality from current to future H , in contrast
to a Ramsey planner. As a consequence, the strength of this dynamic externality is irrelevant for the
equilibrium κt.
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United Kingdom and the United States; a synthetic “rich European OECD economy,”
representing the population weighted average of the European countries in the above list;
the United States; and Japan. We take one period in the model to correspond to 30 years
in the data. Accordingly, we compute three sequences of model predictions with a period
length of 30 years each. In the first sequence, the periods correspond to the years 1970,
2000, 2030, . . . ; in the second sequence, to the years 1980, 2010, 2040, . . . ; and in the
third sequence, to the years 1990, 2020, 2050, . . . . When reporting time series predictions,
we merge the three sequences in a single time series.
We use the 30-year population growth rate as a measure of νt, the number of young
households in period t relative to the number in the preceding period. For pt, the number
of old households in period t relative to the number of young households in the preceding
period, we use estimates for life expectancy at age 65 divided by 30 years.24 Figures 3
and 4 plot the demographic series underlying the model predictions.
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Figure 3: νt for the rich OECD economy (black, “o”), the rich European OECD economy
(red, “e”), the United States (green, “u”), and Japan (blue, “j”).
We set α to 0.3, a standard value in the literature, normalize B0 to unity, and let
χ = 1.135, based on estimates of labor productivity over the life cycle in Heathcote,
Storesletten and Violante (2008).25 To calibrate β, δ, ω, B1 and m, we impose model
restrictions. First, we fix the GDP-shares of transfers and public investment in the year
2000, (1 − α)τ2000 and (1 − α)σ2000 respectively, at the values 0.0796 and 0.0727, the
corresponding averages in the rich OECD economy.26 Second, we fix the balanced-growth-
24Demographic data from the year 1950 onward is taken from Population Division of the Department of
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat (2005, 2007): World Population Prospects,
New York. Population data for the year 1940 is taken from http://www.populstat.info. Data about
life expectancy at age 65 is available up to the year 2000. Data for 2010 to 2050 is extrapolated from
data about life expectancy at birth. Demographic data for the year 2060 and later is extrapolated under
the assumption that p and ν converge to unity in the long run.
25We fit a polynomial to Heathcote et al.’s (2008) estimates for the United States and compute the
average values before and after age 65.
26We proxy the former by the GDP-share of old-age and survivors pensions and the latter by the
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Figure 4: pt for the rich OECD economy (black, “o”), the rich European OECD economy
(red, “e”), the United States (green, “u”), and Japan (blue, “j”).
path growth rate and interest rate when evaluated at the year-2000 demographics at the
observed values in the rich OECD economy.27 Finally, we fix the labor supply of a young
household in the year 2000 at 1/3. These restrictions imply β = 0.7226 (0.9892 on an
annual basis), δ = 0.4039, ω = 1.8256, B1 = 10.7738 and m = 2.7011.
Figures 5–9 display the predicted policy responses to demographic change in the rich
OECD economy, the rich European OECD economy, the United States, and Japan. All
simulations are based on the calibration described above and differ only with respect to
the demographic series fed into the model. As a consequence, the actual budget shares in
the year 2000 are exactly matched in the case of the rich OECD economy.
According to the model predictions displayed in Figure 5, τt more than doubles in
the rich OECD economy between the years 1970 and 2000, flattening out thereafter and
increasing further by approximately three percentage points up to the year 2080. Tax
rate σt increases much slower, rising by slightly more than two percentage points between
the years 1970 and 2080. Retirement age ̺t rises by more than 6 years between 2000 and
2080, to be compared with an increase in life expectancy at age 65 of more than 8 years.
Labor supply of young households (not displayed) rises by about one percent. In contrast
with the savings rate of young households, the national savings rate (not displayed) is
predicted to fall from more than 7 percent in 1970 to roughly 6 percent in 2010 and
roughly 4 percent in 2080, due to the increased fraction of the elderly who are dissaving.
If the retirement age were not allowed to rise beyond its level in the year 2000, the tax
GDP-share of government fixed capital formation and (other) government expenditures for education
(all levels of government). Data is taken from OECD sources. (Due to data limitations, the components
underlying the historical shares reported in the Introduction differ slightly from the ones we choose for the
calibration. In particular, the historical pension-share series contains disability benefits and the historical
investment-share series may be slightly biased due to double counting.)
27We calibrate γH based on the average annual multifactor productivity growth rate of the rich OECD
economy between the years 1985 and 2005, 1.0113 (OECD sources), and R based on Gonzalez-Eiras and
Niepelt’s (2008) estimate of the annual gross interest rate in the United States, 1.0483.
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rate τt would increase steeply and σt would decline, see Figure 6. Intuitively, with a capped
̺t the growing number of non-working old relative to young households would require
increasingly high social-security contributions per young household and the induced rise in
τt would render taxation more costly, triggering a fall in the tax rate σt and crowding out of
government investment. Interestingly, this scenario closely corresponds with fears voiced
in the policy debate. While the model encompasses the mechanisms underlying such fears,
it predicts a different resolution of intergenerational conflict because of adjustments along
the retirement margin.
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Figure 5: Predicted policies for the rich OECD economy: τt (black), σt (red), ̺t (green).
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Figure 6: Predicted policies for the rich OECD economy if ̺t is capped at its year-2000
value: τt (black), σt (red), ̺t (green).
Returning to the scenario where all three policy instruments are free to adjust, the
predicted policy responses in the rich European OECD economy, the United States and
Japan are similar as far as the public investment share is concerned, see Figures 7–9. The
main differences between the three economies concern the budget share for social security
transfers on the one hand and the retirement age on the other: the social-security budget
18
share in the United States and Japan starts out from a lower level than in the rich
European OECD economy but catches up during the early years of the simulation; and
the retirement age increases earlier in the rich European OECD economy and Japan than
in the United States.
In broad terms, these predictions about the relative performance of the three countries
and country blocks are consistent with the evidence. In particular, the model predicts
the GDP-share of social-security transfers in the year 2000, (1− α)τ2000, to be highest in
the rich European OECD economy (nearly 9 percent), followed by Japan and the United
States (more than 7 percent). In the data, the corresponding shares equal roughly 10, 8,
and 6 percent respectively. Similarly, the model correctly predicts that the GDP-share of
public investment, (1−α)σ2000, is higher in Japan than in the United States and the rich
European OECD economy: The model predicts GDP-shares of nearly 8 percent for Japan
and more than 7 percent for the United States and the rich European OECD economy,
in line with the data. The model also performs well in predicting a sharp increase of
retirement age in Japan around the year 1990 and a smoother and later response in the
United States.28 It performs less satisfactory in predicting a robust increase of retirement
age in the rich European OECD economy by the year 1990.29
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Figure 7: Predicted policies for the rich European OECD economy: τt (black), σt (red),
̺t (green).
28In 1994, Japan enacted a rapid increase of retirement age and a reduction of effective tax rates for
workers close to retirement (Yashiro and Oshio, 1999). The model captures this rapid increase, but not
the precise timing. In the United States, the retirement age started to increase around the year 2000, at
a slower rate.
29Empirically, it has only been recently that many European countries have moved towards delaying the
statutory retirement age and reducing the incentives for early retirement (e.g., Galasso, 2006, pp. 23–25),
or to discussing proposals of such policy changes. This suggests that the model does not capture certain
institutional frictions that delay adjustment along the retirement margin, or other motives for changes in
the retirement age. For example, starting in the late 1960s and 1970s, early retirement provisions were
introduced in many OECD countries in response to high levels of unemployment among middle-aged
workers (see, e.g. Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2004). Our framework is silent about these developments.
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Figure 8: Predicted policies for the United States: τt (black), σt (red), ̺t (green).
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Figure 9: Predicted policies for Japan: τt (black), σt (red), ̺t (green).
Figure 10 displays the predicted annual per-capita output growth rates for the four
countries and country blocks under consideration. These growth rates are reported as
deviations from the balanced-growth rates subject to the year-2000 demographics. Annual
growth accelerates by roughly four basis points per decade. By the year 2080, the growth
rates have increased by 30 to 35 basis points. The growth accelerations in the rich OECD
economy, the rich European OECD economy and the United States are very similar and
slightly exceed the one in Japan. If the retirement age were capped at its level in the year
2000 (such that τt would rise steeply and σt decline), per-capita growth would essentially
remain stuck at its current level.
To understand the sources of these predicted growth effects, we compare the per-
capita balanced growth rate along the initial balanced growth path subject to year-2000
demographics with the one along a new balanced growth path subject to p⋆ = ν⋆ = 1.
Recall from the discussion in Subsection 2.5 that the total growth effect of demographic
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Figure 10: Predicted annual per-capita output growth rates for the rich OECD economy
(black, “o”), the rich European OECD economy (red, “e”), the United States (green, “u”),
and Japan (blue, “j”) as deviations from the respective initial balanced-growth rates. The
series at the bottom displays the growth deviation for the rich OECD economy if ̺t is
capped at its year-2000 value.
change can be decomposed into a direct and an indirect, policy induced effect:
dγH((p, ν), κ(p, ν))
d(p, ν)
=
∂γH((p, ν), κ(p, ν))
∂(p, ν)
+
∂γH((p, ν), κ(p, ν))
∂κ
∂κ(p, ν)
∂(p, ν)
.
The first term on the right-hand side includes the direct effect of demographic change on
economic growth as described in Section 2.5. The second term includes the indirect effect
working through induced policy adjustments as discussed in Section 3.
Figure 11 illustrates the relative importance of these two effects. The leftmost bar
(denoted by “initial”) indicates the annual per-capita growth rate along the balanced
growth path subject to year-2000 demographics. The other bars indicate the predicted
annual per-capita growth rates along the new balanced growth path subject to p⋆ and ν⋆
under different assumptions about the adjustment of policy instruments. In particular,
the bar denoted by “new (1)” indicates the new growth rate if only the direct effect is
accounted for, γH((p
⋆, ν⋆), κ(p2000, ν2000)), and the bar denoted by “new (2)” indicates the
new growth rate if direct and indirect effects are accounted for, γH((p
⋆, ν⋆), κ(p⋆, ν⋆)). The
rightmost bar denoted by “new (3)” indicates the new growth rate if direct and indirect
effects are accounted for but the retirement age is held fixed at its year-2000 value.
Figure 11 shows that the direct effect is positive, summing to 57 basis points of annual
growth. In contrast, the indirect effect working through adjustments in policy is negative
and amounts to roughly 10 basis points, due to higher transfers and later retirement and
in spite of higher public investment. With a capped retirement age, the indirect growth
effect would be much more negative (37 rather than 10 basis points), leaving a net growth
increase of only 20 basis points. We emphasize this last point: while in isolation, the
increase of the retirement age works towards reducing growth, fixing the retirement age
would not improve growth prospects; to the contrary, it would go hand in hand with a
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Figure 11: Predicted annual per-capita balanced-growth rate for the rich OECD economy,
around the year 2000 (leftmost bar) and along the new balanced growth path (middle and
rightmost bars).
very steep increase in taxation and thus, an even stronger fall in growth.
In summary, the picture that emerges is only partly consistent with the view promoted
by policy makers according to which the political process will implement measures to raise
productivity in order to “outgrow” the burden imposed by demographic change. Accord-
ing to the model, demographic ageing indeed induces the political process to raise public
investment in order to foster productivity growth. However, the main positive effects
on growth arise directly, through capital deepening, a higher savings rate, and slightly
increased labor supply and the net effect of endogenous policy on growth is negative,
due to higher social security transfers and an increased retirement age. Nevertheless, in
politico-economic equilibrium, flexibility along the retirement margin plays a positive role
for growth. For with a capped retirement age, social security transfers would increase
much more steeply and the induced negative growth effects would be even stronger.
The central predictions of the model are robust to changes in the calibration. Modified
values for the targeted balanced-growth-path interest rate are mainly reflected in adjusted
values for β and δ, leaving the simulation results largely unchanged. Reducing χ renders
the predicted increase of retirement age less pronounced and more delayed. The effects
on the decomposition of the long-run change in γH are small but the growth cost of
capping ̺ is reduced. The most important parameter for calibration purposes is the
capital share α. Increasing α from 0.3 to 0.35 leaves the net long-run effect on γH largely
unchanged but amplifies the positive and negative contributions to this long-run change
through the different channels discussed earlier. The predicted increase in retirement age
is smaller if the capital share is high. If α is reduced to 0.25, the retirement age steeply
increases already before the year 2000. Starting from the high base value in the year
2000, the further increase of the retirement age does not depress growth as strongly as
in the baseline simulation and the net effect of endogenous policy on long-run growth
becomes positive. With a capped retirement age, the net effect of endogenous policy
22
remains strongly negative.
The model predictions are also robust to replacing the endogenous growth specification
by one of exogenous growth. As discussed earlier, the equilibrium policy choices remain
identical in such a variant of the model since the first-order conditions with respect to κt
are unchanged.30 To evaluate the robustness of the implied growth results, we simulate
the model with the exogenous growth specification introduced in Subsection 2.6. This
model specification can be calibrated based on the same moment restrictions used pre-
viously, except for the one relating to the endogenous balanced growth rate. This latter
restriction (which does not apply any longer if γH is determined by the exogenous γB1)
can now be dropped and the previously calibrated parameter in the production function
for productivity growth imposed exogenously in the base year 2000. As a result, the nu-
merical values for the model parameters m, β, δ and ω are given by the values calibrated
previously and the parameter B1 in the endogenous growth specification is replaced by
the sequence {B1,t} whose values grow at the exogenous rate γB1 . Based on this modified
calibration, we can compute the balanced exogenous growth values for the state variables
in the base year, H2000 and q2000, and use the modified law of motion (6) to analyze the
effect of the parameter ε on the growth implications of the demographic transition.
As illustrated in Figure 12, which corresponds to ε = 0.5, the medium-term growth
implications are very similar to those in the endogenous growth specification. With en-
dogenous growth, annual per-capita growth in the rich OECD economy is predicted to
accelerate by 25–30 basis points in the year 2050 and 30–35 basis points in the year 2080
(see Figure 10). With exogenous growth and ε = 0.5, in contrast, growth is predicted
to accelerate by 25 basis points in the year 2050 before the economy begins to revert
to its long-run growth rate of γH = (γB1)
1
(1−δ)(1−ε) . Lower values for ε imply a smaller
maximal growth acceleration around the year 2050 and faster reversion thereafter. If ε
rises towards the limiting value of unity, the growth dynamics increasingly mimic those
of the endogenous growth specification. Finally, if the retirement age is restricted not to
rise beyond its value in the year 2000, per-capita growth remains stuck at its level in the
year 2000, in parallel to the outcome with endogenous growth (see Figure 12).
In conclusion, the specification of productivity growth in the model does not have a
major bearing on the medium-term transition dynamics of the economy and no effect
at all on the short-, medium- and long-run evolution of the policy instruments and the
government budget shares in politico-economic equilibrium.31
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a rich, yet tractable framework to analyze the impact of demographic
ageing on economic growth. Building on a standard overlapping generations model, our
framework combines various channels discussed in the literature and referred to in the
political debate. On the one hand, it captures the implications of rising longevity and
falling fertility in general equilibrium, including adjustments in the savings rate, labor
30The latter result hinges on the assumption that households live for only two periods.
31With exogenous growth, the long-run effect of the demographic transition on output is positive.
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Figure 12: Predicted annual per-capita output growth rate for the rich OECD economy
as deviation from the initial balanced-growth rate if growth is exogenous and ε = 0.5.
The series at the bottom displays the growth deviation if ̺t is capped at its year-2000
value.
supply, factor prices and capital deepening. On the other hand, it captures responses
by the political system, in particular adjustments of the size of the government budget
and its composition between investment and transfer spending as well as changes in the
retirement age.
Calibrated versions of the model predict that annual per-capita growth in rich OECD
economies will increase by roughly 30–35 basis points during the twenty-first century,
with the positive direct growth effects of demographic ageing partly being reversed by the
consequences of endogenous policy responses. The model predictions support the view
that rising longevity paired with falling fertility increases the GDP-share of social secu-
rity transfers, with negative implications for growth. However, they do not support the
common view that rising social security transfers crowd out productive public investment
(as a share of GDP). Crowding out only results in an extreme scenario where the political
process adjusts tax rates and the composition of government spending, but not the retire-
ment age. In the more plausible scenario where the political process adjusts instruments
along all three margins, both social security transfers and public investment as a share
of GDP rise, and the increase of the former is much more moderate than with a fixed
retirement age. These results are robust to changes in the specification of the source of
economic growth.
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the government runs a balanced budget,
excluding government deficits and debt. This assumption is not very restrictive. In our
model, unlike in Bassetto and Sargent (2006) who assume commitment, public under-
investment cannot be overcome by letting voters finance investment expenditures out
of government debt. For lack of commitment implies that the economic equivalence of
social-security and debt policies largely extends to the political sphere.32 We have also
32Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2010) analyze the economic and politico-economic equivalence of fiscal
policies.
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assumed that longevity and fertility are exogenous. While this assumption is useful for
the purpose of studying the long-run effects of demographic ageing on growth, there are
clearly potential feedback effects from government budgets to demographics, for example
via investments in public health (see Hall and Jones, 2007). We leave an analysis of such
feedback effects for future research.
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A Production Efficiency
For generality, productivity growth is specified as Ht+1 = B1H
ε(1−δ)
t I
δ
t with 0 < ε ≤ 1.
For ε < 1, the model does not display endogenous growth.
Consider a path with constant ν and p and let y denote output per worker. Conditional
on Ht and aggregate labor supply, we have
ln(yt+i+1) ≃ α ln(kt+i+1) + δ(1− α)
i∑
j=0
(ε(1− δ))j ln(It+i−j), i ≥ 0.
Starting from the investment policy {kt+i+1, It+i}
∞
i=0, consider a sequence of small reallo-
cations of investment spending. This sequence involves, in each period i, a small change
in public investment of ∆i and a corresponding change in physical investment of −∆i
(per worker in period i). If this policy change weakly increases output in all subsequent
periods, then it amounts to a Pareto improvement and the initial allocation is production
inefficient. Formally, the conditions for production inefficiency are given by
d ln(yt+i+1) = −α
∆t+i
kt+i+1ν
+ δ(1− α)
i∑
j=0
(ε(1− δ))j
∆t+i−j
It+i−j
=
= −α
It+i
kt+i+1ν
ǫt+i + δ(1− α)
i∑
j=0
(ε(1− δ))jǫt+i−j ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 0,
where we define ǫt+i ≡ ∆t+i/It+i, and where at least one inequality must hold strictly.
Since the initial allocation corresponds to a balanced growth path, the recurrent term
a ≡ −α
It+i
kt+i+1ν
+ δ(1− α)
is time-invariant. The conditions for production inefficiency can therefore be summarized
as
aǫt ≥ 0,
aǫt+i + δ(1− α)
i∑
j=1
(ε(1− δ))jǫt+i−j ≥ 0 for all i ≥ 1,
where at least one inequality must hold strictly.
Intuitively, the term a (multiplied by the amount of physical investment) represents the
effect of an infinitesimal reallocation from k to H investment on output in the subsequent
period. To increase output in period t+ 1, ǫt must have the same sign as a. To increase
output in periods later than period t+ 1, the combined effect of the lagged changes in k-
and H-investment must be positive.
When a > 0, capital is over accumulated in the initial allocation. As is apparent from
the above conditions, one can generate a Pareto improvement in this case by reallocating
29
resources from k to H (corresponding to ǫt+i > 0). Over accumulation of capital is also
present if a = 0 and ε(1− δ) > 0, corresponding to the allocation in an economy without
government intervention, but with markets for the provision of the “public investment.”33
In such a setting, savings is allocated across H and k investment in such a way that
output in the subsequent period cannot be increased. However, if ε(1− δ) > 0, the level
of productivity contributes to future productivity growth, and a slight reallocation from
k to H investment therefore increases output in all later periods, as is apparent from
the above conditions. The allocation satisfying a = 0 is not Pareto optimal in this case
because it does not properly account for the dynamic productivity externality.
When a is negative and large in absolute value, the allocation again is production inef-
ficient. In this case, a reallocation of resources from H to k accumulation (corresponding
to ǫt+i < 0) generates a Pareto improvement. For example, if a = −1, a sequence of
ǫt+i = ǫ < 0 for all i ≥ 0 increases production in all future periods because the positive ef-
fect from additional physical investment, aǫ = −ǫ > 0, dominates the cumulative negative
effect from reduced productivity growth, δ(1−α)
∑i
j=1(ε(1−δ))
jǫ < ǫ. To characterize the
largest a < 0 allowing for a persistent increase in output, we consider a sequence {ǫ⋆t+i}
∞
i=0
with ǫ⋆t < 0 where {ǫ
⋆
t+i}
∞
i=1 is recursively defined by the requirement that d ln(yt+i) = 0
for all i ≥ 2. If such a sequence is bounded then production is inefficient. For i ≥ 1, the
terms of such a sequence satisfy aǫ⋆t+i + δ(1− α)
∑i
j=1(ε(1− δ))
jǫ⋆t+i−j = 0. This implies
ǫ⋆t+1 =
δ(1− α)
−a
ε(1− δ)ǫ⋆t
and
ǫ⋆t+i =
δ(1− α)
−a
i∑
j=1
(ε(1− δ))jǫ⋆t+i−j
=
δ(1− α)
−a
ε(1− δ)ǫ⋆t+i−1 +
δ(1− α)
−a
i∑
j=2
(ε(1− δ))jǫ⋆t+i−j
=
δ(1− α)
−a
ε(1− δ)ǫ⋆t+i−1 +
δ(1− α)
−a
ε(1− δ)
i−1∑
j=1
(ε(1− δ))jǫ⋆t+i−j−1
=
δ(1− α)
−a
ε(1− δ)ǫ⋆t+i−1 + ε(1− δ)ǫ
⋆
t+i−1
= ε(1− δ)
(
1−
δ(1− α)
a
)
ǫ⋆t+i−1, i > 1.
Boundedness of the sequence and thus, production inefficiency requires −1 < ε(1 −
δ)
(
1− δ(1−α)
a
)
< 1 which simplifies (due to a < 0) to the condition a < − (1−α)εδ(1−δ)
1−ε(1−δ)
.
In conclusion, if ε(1 − δ) > 0 (such that a = 0 is not efficient), the criterion for
production efficiency is given by − (1−α)εδ(1−δ)
1−ε(1−δ)
≤ a < 0 for a ≡ δ(1− α)− α I
kν
. If the left
33Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier, Paddison and Pestieau (2007) characterize such an econ-
omy; they interpret public investment as public education.
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inequality is violated, then the economy accumulates too much H ; if the right inequality
is violated, then the economy accumulates too much k.
In politico-economic equilibrium, It+i
st+i
= σ
z(1−τ−σ)
and the production efficiency crite-
rion subject to ε = 1 therefore reduces to
1 ≥
α′σ
z(1− τ − σ)
> δ.
From the first-order condition for σ tax rates in politico-economic equilibrium satisfy
α′σ
z(1− τ − σ)
=
δαβp
(1 + αβp)z
= δ
α(1 + βp) + (1− α) τ+ψ−1
ψ
1 + αβp
< δ
where the last inequality follows from τ+ψ−1
ψ
< 1. We conclude that, in politico-economic
equilibrium, the economy necessarily over accumulates k relative to H .
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